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Question 1: What is the difference between an accessory and an accomplice?
Answer:
Each word has reference to one of the guilty parties to a crime involving
two or more offenders. But whereas each of such parties is an accomplice,
many of them are not accessories. As already pointed out the term accessory
is applied only in cases of felony, and does not apply even in a felony case
to one who was actually or constructively present at the moment of its
perpetration. The word accomplice, on the other hand is used whether the
crime involved is treason, felony, or misdemeanor, and without reference
to presence or absence at the moment of perpetration.
An "accomplice" is an associate or companion in crime. Some authori-
ties have used the word in a sense so broad as to include all guilty parties
to the same offense. The more sound usage limits it to those whose guilt
has been connected with the commission of the crime. This includes prin-
cipals in the first degree, principals in the second degree, and accessories
before the fact. It does not include accessories after the fact (but these
are included in the broader meaning employed by some courts).
It is not out of place to mention also, that while the importance of the
word "accessory" is distinctly on the wane, that of "accomplice" appears to
be on the upgrade. For example, a rather common statutory provision
makes the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice insufficient for convic-
tion of crime.
Question 2: What is meant by "legalized murder"?
Answer:
There is no such thing. It is a phrase employed by persons not familiar
with the law. Murder is unlawful homicide committed with malice afore-
thought. Hence, if the homicide is "legalized" it cannot be murder. The
term is usually used to express a very strong opposition to the law which
authorizes homicide in certain situations. Thus, one very much opposed to
capital punishment may refer to the execution of a sentence of death as
"legalized murder"; and another who has very strong feelings against war
may use this expression to designate killings on the field of battle. It would
be beyond the scope of this answer to present an argument for or against
capital punishment, or for or against war. It must suffce for the moment
to say that the phrase "legalized murder" is self-contradictory and hence is
to be avoided by those interested in accuracy of expression.
Question 8: What is meant by the phrase "without beneft of clergy"?
Answer:
This phrase is used on the street with a great variety of meanings, such
for example, as to represent the sad plight of the unmarried mother. Its
original use was in connection with the administration of criminal justice.
At a time when the church was very powerful it succeeded in establishing
'Questions one to seven, inclusive, are from Mr. Perkins and the remainder
from Mr. Meyer.
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the position that no member of the clergy should be tried for felony in the
ordinary criminal law courts of the land. Under the ancient procedure, if
one of this favored group was indicted for such an offense he had only to
assert his "benefit of clergy" and prove his right thereto. Thereupon his
case was transferred to the ecclesiastical court for trial and disposition there.
In the course of time the procedure changed and the common law courts
no longer permitted this privilege to be asserted at the initial stage of the
prosecution, but limited it to one who had entered a plea of guilty, or whose
guilt had been established by the verdict of a jury. After this change was
complete the only effect of benefit of clergy was with reference to the
punishment to be inflicted upon one who had been convicted of felony. This,
however, was a matter of the utmost significance. It was a basic principle
that the church would not impose the punishment of death, and hence he who
was entitled to "benefit of clergy" was not capitally punished. All felonies,
at common law, were punishable by death and forfeiture of goods. Benefit
of clergy, after the change of procedure mentioned, did not protect against
forfeiture of goods, but did save the life of the convicted felon. In order
that persons convicted of certain felonies should not escape the death pen-
alty by this means, it was expressly provided by statute that those convicted
of these felonies should be "without benefit of clergy." Hence this phrase,
as commonly used, did not refer to persons who did not come within this
protection, but to offenses which had been placed beyond its reach by
legislation.
This is all a matter of history; modern criminal procedure has no such
rules.
Question 4: Is motive ever an essential element in the commission of crime?
Answer:
Yes. The books are full of comments to the contrary, but the general
statement to the effect that motive is never an essential element in the com-
mission of crime is too broad. Like most generalizations it is subject to
certain exceptions. In most situations the question of motive is important
only as a clue,--to establish who the guilty person may be. A good motive
is never sufficient, for exculpation if all of the elements of crime are other-
wise established. One, for example, who kills his wife because he loves
her and cannot bear to watch her suffer from an incurable disease, is guilty
of criminal homicide.
But some offenses, for example, have a special mental requirement rep-
resented by the word "corruptly." And no inquiry into whether or not a
certain thing has been done corruptly can ignore the motive of the doer.
Furthermore, the issue of motive may arise in other ways. A rogue may
be committing a grave felony under such circumstances that the killing of
the felon to prevent this crime would be privileged. One who kills him
for that purpose is not guilty of crime. But if at that very moment a
gangster should see the rogue, and without even knowing of the rogue's
intent to commit a felony, should kill him because he had been wanting to
get rid of him, the gangster would be guilty of murder. The intent is the
same,--to kill that person. But a killing under those circumstances with
that intent is no crime if the motive is to promote justice by preventing
the grave felony which is impending, but is murder if the motive is to satisfy
an old grudge.
Question 5: Can a woman be guilty of rape?
Answer:
Yes. If a man who intends to commit murder is unwilling to make the
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effort alone and calls in another to hold the victim while he plunges a
knife into his heart, the second is just as guilty of murder as the first,
provided he was fully aware of the purpose. For the same reason both
men would be guilty of rape if one helped to subdue a woman while another
had felonious intercourse with her. This would be equally true even if the
"assistant" was a woman. A woman cannot herself commit the act of rape,
but she can be guilty of this crime by aiding a man in its perpetration.
Question 6: Under what circumstances may crime be justified or excused?
Answer:
Under no circumstances. As a matter of juridical science there can
never be any justification or excuse for crime. Under many circumstances
a deed which would otherwise be criminal may be justified or excused; but
what is justified or excused is not a crime. For example, one man inten-
tionally kills another. This at once suggests a crime on his part, but he
insists that the other made a murderous assault upon him and that he was
forced to kill in the defense of his own life. If it is found that he was free
from fault and was placed in peril of his life by the felonious attack of the
other and would have suffered death or great bodily injury had he not used
deadly force in his own defense, justification has been established. But it is
not a crime which is justified. Since there was justification for the homicide
no crime was committed.
A crime may be committed under circumstances of mitigation. In such a
case the deed constitutes a crime although the authorities may be warranted
in foregoing prosecution or in inflicting a penalty much milder than would
otherwise be used. But it is contradiction to speak of justification or ex-
cuse for crime.
Question 7: I have a friend who divorced her former husband last winter
and plans to marry another man this summer. The statute of her state
forbids either party to marry again "within six months from the date of
the filing of said decree," and punishes a violation of this law by a pen-
alty which may be as severe as six months in jail. She does not wish
to run any risk of being found guilty of such a crime, but has plans she
is eager to carry out if no such risk is involved. Her divorce decree was
filed on February 29, 1944, and she planned her second marriage for
August 30, 19,4. Could she safely have carried out that plan?
No. She should have delayed the wedding at least two days. In the
early English common law the word "month" was held to mean a lunar
month of twenty-eight days (although the true lunar month is longer than
this). But in most of the states in this country at the present time the
word "month" means calendar month when it is used alone. It is also to
be borne in mind that in computing periods of time the law excludes the first
day and includes the last. Thus a ten day period from November 6 ends
at the close of November 16. For the same reason a year from July 1 ends
at the close of July 1 on the following year, although if the first July 1
was counted the period would end at midnight on June 30. The ancient
jingle of a "year and a day" encountered in homicide cases dates back to
the time when the judges were not certain whether a year from July 1
would include the following July 1 or not. But the settled rule now is that
it is included without calling it a "year and a day."
Since this is the rule in computing periods of time and since "month"
means calendar month, it follows that the end of a period of one month from
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January 1 to February 1, the end of a period of two months from March
10 is May 10, and that of six months from April 15 is October 15. This
is too well settled for controversy, but a different element enters into the
computation if we are dealing with a period of a month from January 31 or
from February 29.
There still seems to be some support for the notion that one month from
January 31 should end two days later than one month from January 29.
If this were true the former period would end March 2 in Leap-year and
on March 3 in any other year (since on the same theory a period of one
month from January 29 would carry over to March 1 except in Leap-year).
For the most part, however, the authorities now seem fairly well agreed
on the view that a month from either January 28, 29, 30, or 31, will end
at the close of February 28 (unless it is Leap-year). This has suggested
the statement that a period of one month (or several months) from any
day ends at the close of the corresponding day of the following (or later)
month, if that month has so many days, and if not it ends at the close of
the last day of that month.
If this statement could be accepted without qualification a six month
period from February 29 would end at the close of August 29 and the
answer to the question would be that sufficient time would have lapsed since
the divorce, and no crime would have been committed by marriage on
August 30. Some courts, however, insist that a different answer is required
when the period is figured from the last day of a month. The reasoning is
this: since the first day is not counted, a period of one month from the last
day of any month does not include any part of that month and hence must
include all of the following month. By this method of computation, a month
from February 29 would end with the close of the following month, or at
midnight on March 31; and six months from February 29 would include all
of each of the six following months, and hence would not end until the close
of August 31.
Although this method of computation has not been uniformly accepted
it is quite sound and the present trend of the cases seems to be in this direc-
tion. Hence, it would not have been safe for your friend to marry until the
first of September.
Question 8: Assuming that two defendants have honorable backgrounds,
does placing one on probation entitle the other to the same treatment?
Answer:
The answer to this question is no, because, as indicated above, probation
is not a right, it is a favor. In United States vs. Gargano the Supreme
Court held that placing one defendant on probation does not entitle the co-
defendant to probation, even when both have similar backgrounds.
Question 9: How much proof is necessary to revoke probation?
Answer:
The law requires that before probation is revoked, the defendant be
given a hearing before the court to determine that there has been no abuse
of discretion in revoking probation. This does not mean that the defendant
is entitled to a trial however. The degree of proof need not convince the
court beyond a reasonable doubt as is necessary at the trial of the case. It
is enough if the court is reasonably satisfied that revocation is to the best
interest of the majority concerned. (Esco vs. Zerbst 295 U. S. 490.)
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Question 10: Does a person who has been placed on probation lose his cvil
rights?
Answer:
That depends upon the law of the state in which he resides. Most of
the civil rights are derived from state law, not from Federal laws, and there-
fore the civil rights of federal probationers are determined by the states in
which they live. There is some question however, as to whether or not pro-
bation always constitutes a conviction. A man can be placed on probation
before any sentence has been imposed, or he can be placed on probation
after a sentence has been pronounced but its execution stayed or suspended.
Now the question is: Is there a conviction when no sentence is given? In
Berman vs. United States, 802 U. S. 211, 212, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that "final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sen-
tence is the judgment." Accordingly it might be argued that there is no
judgment of conviction in the first type of probation since no sentence has
been imposed. It would seem then that the state laws governing civil rights
would apply only to the latter kind of probation where a conviction or judg-
ment of sentence was entered.
There is need for further clarification on this point.
